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Abstract
Competition between insurance companies for employees of a ﬁrm often increases
the prices and reduces the availability of high-quality health plans oﬀered to employees.
An insurance company can reduce competition by signing an exclusive contract, which
guarantees that the company is the only insurance provider. The study assesses whether
exclusive contracts can alleviate the negative consequences of competition. Using the
nation-wide survey of employers, I ﬁnd that exclusive insurers charged 39-42% less for
a unit of insurance quality than non-exclusive insurers. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that the
pattern of insurance quality dispersion is consistent with the exclusive insurers oﬀering
more high quality plans.
1 Introduction
Employers provide health insurance to the majority of Americans. When deciding on health
coverage, employers must choose the number and quality of insurance plans to oﬀer and
whether to contract with one or multiple insurance companies. Economists often argue that
competition between health plans or insurance providers is a way to increase the value of
insurance. The competition may lead to lower prices (Ma and Browne, 2005; Bundorf, 2010;
Vistnes et al., 2001) and to overall welfare gains (Bundorf et al., 2008; Ma and Browne, 2005).
The downside of the competition is that the high-quality plans tend to be provided at a much
higher price or not provided at all (Jack, 2001; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Frank et al., 2000;
Ellis and Aragao, 2001). Insurance companies often compete to attract healthier employees
(Ellis, 1998). Thus, they are less likely to oﬀer high quality plans where less healthy employees
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are concentrated (Frank et al., 2000). I am interested in whether a barrier to competition
would induce insurance companies to oﬀer higher quality plans that could increase welfare.
Employers can construct a barrier to competition by signing exclusive contracts with
insurance companies. An exclusive contract guarantees that a single company will be the
only insurance provider for the employees in the ﬁrm. This paper is the ﬁrst to study the
application of these contracts to health insurance. Exclusive insurers may be more likely to
oﬀer high-quality plans because they are less likely to face entrants that may attract away the
healthier employees. Also, exclusive insurers can subsidize high-quality plans if this subsidy
is welfare enhancing (Jack, 2001; Barros, 2003; Glazer and McGuire, 2000).
I present a simple model of competition between health insurance plans oﬀered in a
ﬁrm. The model shows when subsidizing of a high quality plan increases total consumer
surplus. The model predicts that ﬁrms with exclusive contracts are more likely to oﬀer high-
quality plans, and these high-quality plans may be subsidized by the insurance company, –
resulting in lower premiums. The 1997 nation-wide survey of employers by the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation provides data for studying the quality and price of health plans oﬀered
by exclusive and non-exclusive insurers. The survey collected information on the exclusivity
of insurance contracts, along with extensive information on the quality of the health plans
oﬀered by employers. I construct an index that measures the quality of health plans in
order to test whether the price of a unit of quality diﬀers among the ﬁrms with and without
exclusive contracts. Using this index I test the proposition that ﬁrms with exclusive health
insurance contracts are more likely to oﬀer high-quality plans by comparing the range of the
quality of plans oﬀered in these ﬁrms.
Empirical results support the model’s predictions. For the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts,
the price of a unit of quality is 39-42 percent lower than for ﬁrms with non-exclusive contracts.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that exclusive insurers charge lower prices
for high-quality plans. Furthermore, the quality of plans oﬀered to ﬁrms with exclusive
contracts is more diverse indicating that these ﬁrms may oﬀer more high quality plans.
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These results suggest that employers and administrators of Medicare Advantage programs
can use exclusive contracts to reduce prices for high-quality plans. The results also indicate
that antitrust authorities need to exercise caution when they investigate exclusive contracts
in health insurance because these contracts may be increasing welfare.
2 Background
Prices for employer-provided health insurance are set at the plan level. Insurance companies
are forbidden by law from setting diﬀerent prices for individual employees enrolled in the
same plan. There are two factors that determine the price of a plan: the plan’s quality
(the amount of insurance the plan provides) and the health expenditures of the enrolled
employees.
A concentration of high-cost employees in high-quality plans increases the premiums for
these plans and creates ineﬃciency by pricing out the medium-cost employees out of these
plans in the process of adverse selection (Frank et al., 2000). Even more troubling is the
case in which the distribution of medical expenditures is so skewed to the right that most
employees in the ﬁrm may be priced out of the high-quality plan by a very few high-cost
employees.1 As a result, the consumer surplus of the employees who were priced out of the
high-quality plans is reduced. Research of employee welfare losses from adverse selection
produced mixed results. Cutler and Reber (1998) found signiﬁcant welfare losses, while
Einav et al. (2008) and Carlin and Town (2007) found that the losses were small.
A subsidy of a high-quality plan can attract healthier employees to the plan and increase
the total consumer surplus if the gain in the consumer surplus of the employees enrolled in
the high-quality plan will exceed the loss of the employees enrolled in the low-quality plan.
This subsidy is not possible if a competitor can enter the market and undercut the price of the
subsidizing plan.2 Even if there is no cross-subsidization of the health plans, entrance of a new
1Medical costs in the US population are well approximated by a log-normal distribution that is skewed
to the right (Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Duan, 1983; de Ven and Praag, 1981; Diehr et al., 1999).
2In the telephone interview a sales representative of an insurance company said that his company demands
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insurer can lead to a very unstable market and to losses of the incumbent insurance company
(Sutton et al., 2004) because healthier employees have higher price elasticity of demand for
health insurance (Royalty and Solomon, 1999; Stromborn et al., 2002; Buchmueller and
Feldstein, 1997). Exclusive contracts designed to protect insurance companies from new
entrants can induce them to decrease the prices of high-quality plans.
Exclusive contracts cannot completely prevent competition because an insurance contract
can be dissolved at any time and an exclusive clause is not legally enforceable. Exclusive
contracts state that the insurance company will oﬀer speciﬁc coverage at a speciﬁc price as
long as the company remains the sole provider of insurance. The acceptance of exclusive
contract is a credible signal from employers that they are interested in an exclusive relation-
ship with the insurance company. This signal is not without risk for the employer; if the
employer decides to add another insurer, the incumbent insurer will rescind the contract,
imposing the costs on employees and the employer. Handel (2010) and Cebul et al. (2008)
ﬁnd large costs associated with switching insurance companies. Exclusive contacts may not
eliminate the probability of entry, but they should decrease the probability.
3 Model
3.1 Set Up
The model needs to show how competition among insurance companies, or a lack thereof,
aﬀects consumer surplus and the sorting of employees into health plans. In the model, a
ﬁrm oﬀers two health plans: one that provides basic coverage (low quality) and a second
one that provides comprehensive coverage (high quality). Let  denote the expected medical
expenditures of an employee, where  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The beneﬁts
employees derive from the plans are linear functions of . The cost to insurance companies
exclusive contract because the company is afraid that the plan they oﬀer will be adversely selected against
and exclusivity allows them to have suﬃcient participation rate (telephone interview, June 15, 2009).
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to provide the plans is a linear function of the average  of the employees enrolled in the
plans (h, l). I assume that the increase in the beneﬁt from a higher quality plan is due to
the marginal increase in  is higher than the costs associated with this increase (b>d).
Benefit(High) = a+ b
Cost(High) = c+ dh
Benefit(Low) = e
Cost(Low) = fl:
(1)
The willingness to pay for the high-quality plan is an increasing function of . At a given
price for a high-quality plan, there exists a ^ such that all employees with  > ^ choose the
high-quality plan and all employees with  < ^ choose the low-quality plan. The price of
the high-quality plan reﬂects the average expenditures of the employees in the plan in the
following way:
P (^) = c+ d E(j > ^) = c+ d(1 + ^)=2; (2)
provided 0 < ^ < 1. If the employee with  = ^ is indiﬀerent between the choice the two
plans, we can explicitly ﬁnd ^:
Benefit(^)H   Price(^)H = Benefit(^)L   Price(^)L
a+ b^   c  d(1 + ^)=2 = e^   0:5f^
^ = (c  a+ d=2)=(b  e+ 0:5f   0:5d):
(3)
3.2 Subsidy and Equilibrium
Prices under exclusive contracts may be diﬀerent from the prices under non-exclusive ar-
rangements (equation 2) when the entry of a new insurer is possible. With an exclusive
contract, employees in the low-quality plan can subsidize the employees in the high-quality
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plan. Let S be the total amount of subsidy for all employees enrolled in the high-quality
plan. The subsidy under the exclusive contract makes the high-quality plan more attractive,
and some employees from the low-quality plan will switch to the high-quality plan. Then
there will be a new employee ^e indiﬀerent to a choice between the two plans. The employ-
ees have smaller expected medical expenditures than the indiﬀerent employees without the
subsidy, i.e., ^e < ^c (ﬁgure 1). The new indiﬀerent employee is determined by:
a+ b^e   c  d(1 + ^e)=2 + S=(1  ^e) = e^e   0:5f ^e   S=^e: (4)
The subsidy also increases the price of the low-quality plan by S=^e, and it decreases the
price of the high-quality plan by S=(1  ^e) (ﬁgure 1). The subsidy S may increase the total
consumer surplus if the gain of the employees in the high-quality plan exceeds the loss to the
employees in the low-quality plan because of wider participation in the high-quality plan.
3.3 Consumer Surplus
The consumer surplus from the two plans is equal to the sum of beneﬁts minus the price
employees pay:
CS =
1Z
^
(a+ b + S=(1  ^)) 
1Z
^
(c+ d) +
^Z
0
((e  f)   S=^)
CS = 0:5^2(d  b+ e  f) + ^(c  a) + a  c+ 0:5b  0:5d
(5)
@CS
@S
=
@CS
@^
@^
@S
= (c  a+ ^(d  b+ e  f)) @^
@S
: (6)
A proposition follows from this calculation.
Proposition 1. There exist parameters a, b, c, d, e, f such that the ﬁrm has a separating
equilibrium and the subsidy of the high-quality plan increases the consumer surplus (for the
proof, see the Appendix).
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(e^ f ^ (a+b^ c d^) = (Benefit(^)L Cost(^)L) (Benefit(^)H Cost(^)H) < 0: (7)
This result is shown in the ﬁgure 1. Let Rh (Rl) be the diﬀerences between the beneﬁt
an employee derives from high-quality (low-quality) plan the costs of providing the plan to
the employee. The subsidy increases welfare if Rh is larger than Rl for the employee with
 = ^.
The reason the employee cannot obtain a higher surplus from the high-quality plan is
that the price of the plan exceeds the beneﬁts the employee derives from a high-quality plan.
A ﬁrm maximizes the total consumer surplus if it subsidizes the high-quality plan while
Rh > Rl. The subsidy equalizes the diﬀerence between marginal net beneﬁts of the two
plans, which results in a gain in the consumer surplus (ﬁgure 2.
3.4 Infeasibility of the High-Quality Plan
Employers may not be able to oﬀer the high quality plan without a subsidy if employees are
not willing to pay for the average medical expenditures of high-quality plan (ﬁgure 3).
Proposition 2. There exist parameters a, b, c, d, e and f such that the subsidy of the
high-quality plan increases the consumer surplus if no employee chooses the high-quality plan
without a subsidy. The suﬃcient conditions for this results are:
a  c > b  d+ f   e2b  1:5d < 2e  1:5f: (8)
A subsidy of the otherwise infeasible high-quality plan may increase the consumer surplus
if the employees with medium or low medical expenditures have a suﬃciently high consumer
surplus from the high-quality plan. The employees with high expenditures cannot pay for
their own expenditures in the high-quality plan – this is the root of its infeasibility. However,
7
if a subsidy increases participation of the healthier employees, they bring the average expen-
ditures and premiums down making the high-quality plan feasible. I model the subsidy as
a transfer from the employees in the low-quality plan to the employees in the high-quality
plan. The subsidy has to be small enough to ensure suﬃcient participation in the low-quality
plan.
The subsidy decreases the price of the high-quality plan and increases the price of the
low-quality plan. In addition, the subsidy attracts healthier employees to the high-quality
plan that further decreases its price (ﬁgure 1). The subsidy is not possible without an
exclusive contract, because a competitor could oﬀer the low-quality plan at a lower price
and lure away the healthier employees.
3.5 Empirical Predictions
The model makes two empirical predictions: (1) The relative price of the high-quality plan
in ﬁrms with exclusive contracts is lower than in ﬁrms with non-exclusive contracts; (2) ﬁrms
with exclusive contracts are more likely to oﬀer high-quality plans.
4 Data
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation conducted a survey of employers in the 48 contiguous
states and the District of Columbia. This 1997 survey was based on geographical and ﬁrm-
size strata with random selection within each stratum. The survey asked employers about
the health plans they oﬀered. When an employer said the ﬁrm was oﬀering more than
one health plan, the survey asked whether the employer had an exclusive contract with an
insurance company. There were 3,203 ﬁrms (with 15,468 plans) who provided information
as to whether they had an exclusive contract with their health insurance company.
My econometric speciﬁcation requires each ﬁrm to have a complete set of plan control
variables (deductibles, copayments, etc.) for at least two plans. After I dropped observations
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that had missing control variables, 1,913 ﬁrms (with 10,257 plans) remained in the sample.
Out of these ﬁrms, 299 (with 1,126 plans) are self-insured.3 I dropped these ﬁrms because I
consider an entry barrier necessary to protect an incumbent insurance company, and in the
self-insured ﬁrms there is no incumbent insurance company to protect. My ﬁnal sample for
the estimation consisted of 1,604 ﬁrms (with 9,335 plans).
4.1 Firms
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the ﬁrms with exclusive and non-exclusive in-
surers. The table provides information on 1,235 ﬁrms, that is less than 1,635 ﬁrms used
in estimation. The discrepancy is a result of the missing ﬁrm-level variables presented in
the descriptive statistics, although these variables are not used in estimations that features
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Firms with exclusive providers tended to have a slightly larger total num-
ber of employees, but a signiﬁcantly smaller sized of establishments, than the ﬁrms with
non-exclusive providers. The employees in the ﬁrms with non-exclusive providers were more
likely to be females. However, the distributions of employees’ wage, age and hours of work
were similar. Firms with non-exclusive insurers oﬀered a larger number of plans than ﬁrms
with exclusive insurers.
4.2 Plans
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the plan-level variables for ﬁrms with and without
exclusive contracts. The premium is the total monthly amount that insurance companies
charge the employer. Health plans oﬀered in the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts covered
slightly fewer services than the ones oﬀered in the ﬁrms with non-exclusive providers. The
exclusive plans have longer waiting periods for the coverage of pre-existing conditions and
also higher deductables – the dollar amount of the yearly claims that is not covered by the
3Self-insured ﬁrms take on the risk of providing insurance to their employees, although they may hire an
insurance company to administer the insurance policies.
9
insurance company – along with higher copayments and coinsurance rates. The copayment
is a ﬁxed dollar payment employees need to make each time they use a medical provider.
Coinsurance is the percent of medical claim that is not covered by insurers. Plans with
exclusive contracts are more likely to an annual out-of-pocket maximum that protects the
insured against very large claims.
There are four major types of health plans oﬀered to employees in the survey data set:
Indemnity Plan, Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), Point of Service Plan (POS),
and Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). These types vary in whether they restrict the
choice of medical providers and utilization of medical services ( see Bundorf (2002) for further
discussion).
Actuarial value of a plan is a primary measure of insurance, which is the share of the
expected medical expenditures covered by the insurance. This value was calculated by the
designers of the survey in the following manner. First, they estimated the expected medical
expenditures of employees using demographic information and geographical location. Then
they estimated the share of the expenditures covered by insurance linking expected medical
expenditures with the insurance contract information. The actuarial value is bounded be-
tween 0 and 1. For example, if an actuarial value is 0.77, then 77% of the expected medical
expenditures will be covered by the insurance. The actuarial values of the plans oﬀered by
exclusive and non-exclusive providers are similar. The last two lines of table 2 provide de-
scriptive statistics for the plan’s quality predicted by using the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Exclusive
providers tend to oﬀer higher quality plans than those oﬀered by non-exclusive providers,
for both single and family coverage.
5 Estimating the Price of Quality
The quality of a plan has many parameters such as amount of the deductible, choice of
providers, etc. The ﬁrst step in determining a plan’s quality is to estimate the how these
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parameters contribute to its price by regressing the premium on the plan characteristics
presented in table 2. The model shows that in the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts this rela-
tionship can be distorted by subsidies. Therefore, at this point ﬁrms with exclusive contracts
are omitted, because the goal of the ﬁrst step is to measure how quality is related to price 4
The premium predicted by using the coeﬃcients estimated in this regression is an index
of the plan’s quality. There are some unobserved ﬁrm characteristics correlated with the
premium, such as distribution of health expenditures in the ﬁrm, administrative costs, prior
health claims, etc. I control for an unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
The regression equation is
Premiumjk =
NX
i=1
^Qijk + uk + ejk (9)
where uk is a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. I use the coeﬃcients estimated in equation (9) to estimate
the quality of plans for all ﬁrms:
^Quality =
NX
i=1
^Qijk: (10)
The model predicts that in the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts, employees in low-quality
plans subsidize employees in the high-quality plans. This subsidy increases the price of low
quality plans and decreases the price of high-quality plans in these ﬁrms. The model does
not make explicit predictions about the ﬁrms that oﬀer more than two plans, but I expect
to see a lower price per unit of quality in the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts. To measure the
price of a unit of quality, I regress the price of the plans on the predicted quality with ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects. I use a bootstrap procedure to estimate standard errors because ^Quality is a
4The omitted variables are indicators of whether a plan covers physicians, hospital use, and mental
health treatments, indicator for a gatekeeper physician, squared coinsurance, squared copayment, squared
deductible, and a third-degree polynomial of actuarial value.
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generated regressor:
Premiumjk = 1 + 1 ^Qualityjk + 2 ^Qualityjk  Exclusive Providerk
+vk + ejk:
(11)
The coeﬃcient 2 shows how much lower the price per unit of quality is in the ﬁrms with
exclusive contracts. If I ﬁnd a lower price per unit of quality in the ﬁrms with exclusive
contracts, it does not necessarily imply the existence of subsidies. Subsidies result in a
higher price for low-quality plans, but the use of the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects prevents me from
estimating the diﬀerence in the prices of low-quality plans.
5.1 Who Oﬀers High-Quality Plans?
I test the proposition that the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts are more likely to oﬀer high-
quality plans by comparing the quality of the plans in the survey. The comparison of quality
across ﬁrms is problematic because diﬀerent ﬁrms are often charged diﬀerent prices for the
same plans (Cutler, 1994); a good quality plan for one ﬁrm may be of bad quality for another.
However, if ﬁrms with exclusive contracts can oﬀer high-quality plans and the ﬁrms without
these contracts cannot, then the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts should have higher range of
a quality levels in the plans they oﬀer. The range of quality is the diﬀerence between the
plans with highest and lowest quality levels.
6 Results
In this section, I test the hypotheses that in the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts, high-quality
plans have lower premiums than similar plans in the ﬁrms without such contracts. In ad-
dition, I test whether the range of quality is higher than in the ﬁrms without exclusive
contracts.
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6.1 The Price of Quality
Table 3 presents the estimated coeﬃcients from linear regressions of price on predicted
quality. In the ﬁrms with exclusive insurers, the price of quality for single coverage is 42
percentage points less than the price in the ﬁrms with non-exclusive insurers (coeﬃcient is
statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level) for single coverage. For the family coverage, the ﬁrms
with exclusive contracts shows a price for quality that is 39 percentage points lower than in
the ﬁrms with non-exclusive contracts, although the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant.
6.2 The Range of Quality
I constructed quality measures using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects; thus the means of predicted quality
are not inﬂuenced by ﬁrm characteristics. However, the number of plans a ﬁrm carries is
likely to be positively correlated with the range in quality of the ﬁrms, although the exact
nature of this relationship is diﬃcult to predict.5
Table 4 presents ranges of quality oﬀered by ﬁrms and the coverage rates in the ﬁrms
with two to ﬁve plans. Among the ﬁrms that oﬀer two health plans, the range of quality in
the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts is higher (a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 5%
level) than in the ﬁrms with no exclusive contracts. For the single coverage, the diﬀerence in
the range of quality is $4.2 (23% of one s.d. for the group), and for the family coverage the
diﬀerence is $9.2 (25% of one s.d. for the group). Among the ﬁrms that oﬀer more than two
plans, the diﬀerence between the ranges of quality is not signiﬁcant. The model predicts that
exclusive contracts increase the range of quality only for the ﬁrms with two plans and for
the single coverage plans in the ﬁrms with four plans. The eﬀects of the exclusive contracts
on the ﬁrms with more than two plans depends on the market segmentation of these plans.
The diﬀerence in the coverage rate between the ﬁrms with and without exclusive contracts
is insigniﬁcant.
5To understand the exact relationship between the range in quality and the number of plans oﬀered in
a ﬁrm, one needs to model competition between multiple plans, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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7 Robustness Checks
The model considers the ﬁrms that oﬀer only two health plans, so it is important to make
sure that the results from these ﬁrms support the model’s predictions. Table 5 shows the
regression results for the two-plan ﬁrms. The magnitudes of the estimated coeﬃcients are
similar to those in the table 3. The standard errors of the estimated coeﬃcients are larger,
as expected, because of the smaller sample size.
The model predicts that the subsidy provided by insurance companies lowers the price
of quality in ﬁrms with exclusive contracts. However, a similar eﬀect can be achieved if
employers rather than insurers subsidize the high-quality plans. These subsidies can attract
healthier employees and lower the costs of providing these plans. The lower costs can be
transmitted to the employers as lower prices for high-quality plans. Average payments of
the employers are shown in table 6. To ensure that my results are not driven by employers
subsidies, I regress the premium that employers pay on the quality of the plans and on the
interaction of the quality with the indicator of exclusive contract. Table 7 shows the results.
Employers with exclusive contracts subsidize high-quality plans slightly more than em-
ployers with no such contracts, although the estimates are very imprecise. Even if we assume
that these estimates are correct, they are still very small to be considered drivers of the re-
sults. Employers with exclusive contracts subsidize a unit of quality in family and single
plans by 9 and 18 percent more than employers without these contracts. This small subsidy
is not likely to account for the whole 39-42 percent discount for a unit of quality that ﬁrms
with exclusive contracts receive from insurance companies.
Self-insured ﬁrms were dropped from the primary estimation because the model consid-
ered the competition between insurance companies. However, these self-insured ﬁrms are
interesting because they have more control over the design of insurance plans then ﬁrms
purchasing insurance from the market. Self-insured ﬁrms can decrease the prices of the high
quality plans if they consider this move to be beneﬁcial. In table 8, self-insured ﬁrms are
considered as a separate category, in order to see if the price of a unit of quality is diﬀer-
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ent than in ﬁrms without exclusive contracts. I ﬁnd the price of a unit of quality in the
self-insured ﬁrms to be 3 percentage points lower than in the fully insured ﬁrms with no
exclusive contracts. This is a very small diﬀerence relative to estimated 30 percentage points
diﬀerence in the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts.
8 Conclusions
This paper is the ﬁrst to analyze the characteristics and eﬀects of exclusive contracts between
employers and insurance companies. Even though exclusive contracts are legally unenforce-
able, they have signiﬁcant eﬀect on the price of insurance. I ﬁnd that, in ﬁrms with exclusive
contracts, the relative prices for high-quality plans are lower than in ﬁrms with no such con-
tracts. I also ﬁnd that the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts and two health plans have a larger
range of quality, indicating that these ﬁrms oﬀer more higher quality plans.
Much of related economic research has focused on the costs and beneﬁts of allowing
competition between health insurance plans. Researchers found that competition is a good
tool for employers to lower the costs of insurance, but that competition is also associated
with a decrease in the quality of the plans. In this analysis, I show that there is a tool for
employers who want to lower the price of high-quality plans: An exclusive contract with a
health insurance company. In addition, exclusive contracts can be used by administrators of
Medicare Advantage programs who contract with private health plans to provide services to
more than 10 million Americans (Berenson and Dowd, 2009).
The results of the paper are also important for the ongoing discussion on welfare implica-
tions of exclusive contracts. The attitudes of antitrust authorities toward exclusive contracts
have varied over time, but they have generally been more lenient toward these contracts than
the academic economists (Lafontaine and Slade, 2005; Segal and Whinston, 2000). I show
that exclusive contracts between health insurance companies and employers can increase
welfare, supporting the more lenient attitude of antitrust authorities.
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The major limitation of the article is that I cannot identify the exact mechanism that
drives the variation in prices of high- and low-quality plans. The lower prices for high-
quality plans in the ﬁrms with exclusive contracts can be driven by a cross-subsidy, where
employees in low quality plans subsidize employees in high-quality plans. Alternatively,
exclusive contracts can lower the probability of rival insurance company entry and decrease
the expected costs of exclusive insurance companies. The lower costs can be transmitted
to employers via lower prices. In this article, I broadly deﬁne when the subsidization of
the high-quality plan increases consumer surplus and makes it optimal for a ﬁrm to sign
an exclusive contract with an insurer. The question of why exclusive contracts increase
consumer surplus for some ﬁrms and not for others requires a more speciﬁc answer.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
@CS
@S
=
@CS
@^
@^
@S
= (c  a+ ^(d  b+ e  f)) @^
@S
(12)
The subsidy of the high-quality plan increases enrollment in the plan; hence @^
@S
< 0. There
are two possible cases for this in a separating equilibrium:
Case I :
a  c  0:5d > 0
e  0:5f   b+ 0:5d > 0
e+ 0:5d  0:5f   b > a  c  0:5d
(13)
The change in the consumer surplus increases in b. Maximum b, subject to the constraints
in 13, approaches c  a+ d  e  0:5f . Then:
@^
@S
= (c  a+ ^(d  b+ e  f)
= (c  a+ ^(a  c  0:5f)
< (^   1)(a  c)
< 0:
(14)
If @^
@S
< 0 then @CS
@S
> 0.
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Case II
a  c  0:5d < 0
e  0:5f   b+ 0:5d < 0
e+ 0:5d  0:5f   b < a  c  0:5d:
(15)
The change in the consumer surplus decreases in c. Minimum c, subject to the constraints
15, approaches a  d+ b  e+ 0:5f . Then:
@^
@S
= (c  a+ ^(d  b+ e  f)
= ( d+ b  e+ 0:5f + ^(d  b+ e  f)
< ( 0:5d+ b  e+ 0:5f + ^(0:5d  b+ e  0:5f)
< (^   1)(0:5d  b+ e  0:5f)
< 0:
(16)
Therefore for both cases there exist parameters a, b, c, d, e, and f such that @CS
@S
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. If the high quality plan is infeasible, then even the sickest employee
would choose to purchase the low-quality plan:
a+ b  c  0:5d < e  0:5f
e  0:5f > 0: (17)
The diﬀerence in the total consumer surplus if both plans are oﬀered versus only the low-
quality plan is:
CS = CS(two plans)  CS(one plan)
= 0:5^2(d  b+ e  f) + ^(c  a) + a  c+ 0:5b  0:5d  0:5e+ 0:5f
= (1  ^)(a  c) + 0:5(1  ^2)(b  d+ f   e):
(18)
CS is positive if
a  c > b  d+ f   e: (19)
Plugging constraint leads to the following constraints:
a  c > b  d+ f   e2b  1:5d < 2e  1:5f: (20)
There exist parameters that satisfy the constraints above if (a - c) is suﬃciently larger (b -
d). For example, the values a = 0.5, c = 0.1, d = 0.1, d = 0.3, f = 0.2 and e = 0.3 will ﬁt
the constraints.
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10 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: Insurance Market
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Figure 2: Change in Total Consumer Surplus
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Figure 3: Subsidy with Infeasible High Quality Plan
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Level Variables
Non-Exclusive Exclusive
Number of employees in establishment 401.15 164.43
(1,505.8) (257.8)
Number of employees nationwide 2,619.5 3,456.8
(6,079.3) (7,374.6)
Temporary employees, % 4.74 5.92
(12.74) (14.87)
Full time workers, % 79.13 81.99
(31.34) (29.55)
35-39 hr/wk workers, % 11.29 11.21
(25.48) (25.16)
20-34 hr/wk workers, % 6.66 4.30
(13.72) (9.33)
Less than 20 hr/wk workers, % 2.93 2.51
(9.57) (10.31)
Female workers, % 48.53 43.03
(28.34) (29.11)
Less than $5/hr workers, % 2.17 2.64
(9.92) (10.22)
$5-7/hr workers, % 11.07 12.01
(20.97) (21.63)
$7-10/hr workers, % 20.40 23.31
(22.98) (24.94)
$10-15/hr workers, % 28.73 29.77
(24.38) (27.18)
More than $15/hr workers, % 37.69 32.32
(30.99) (29.41)
Less than 30 y.o workers, % 30.21 30.43
(22.98) (20.95)
30-39 y.o workers, % 29.93 30.30
(19.94) (18.62)
40-49 y.o workers, % 24.43 23.95
(19.11) (18.54)
More than 50 y.o. workers, % 15.46 15.39
(17.77) (18.17)
Union indicator 0.11 0.12
(0.32) (0.32)
Age of the ﬁrm, years 40.91 41.68
(36.98) (38.01)
Turnover rate per year 0.40 0.45
(0.63) (0.55)
Number of plans oﬀered 3.15 2.7
Continued
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Table 1 continued
(1.8) (1.29)
N 1,090 145
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the means.
Numbers in the brackets are standard errors of the means.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Health Plans
Non-Exclusive Exclusive
Premium for single coverage, $ 165.78 161.64
(41.34) (49.57)
Premium for family coverage, $ 423.94 418.04
(90.79) (128.31)
Vision care covered, % 0.58 0.53
(0.49) (0.50)
Dental care covered, % 0.34 0.20
(0.47) (0.40)
Number of employees in a plan 677.62 332.44
(5840.83) (2450.12)
Number of active employees in a plan 490.11 271.56
(3570.34) (1766.09)
Waiting period, days 15.86 53.06
(68.26) (118.20)
Deductable, $ 26.21 88.11
(97.48) (204.89)
Copayment, $ 7.91 9.37
(3.82) (3.64)
Coinsurance rate, % 15.81 18.73
(7.65) (7.30)
Indicator that coinsurance rates vary .85 .45
(0.36) (0.50)
Indicator of maximum out of pocket expense 0.64 0.72
(0.48) (0.45)
HMO plan 0.72 0.65
(0.45) (0.48)
POS plan 0.11 0.11
(0.31) (0.32)
PPO Plan 0.16 0.20
(0.37) (0.40)
Indemnity plan 0.01 0.04
(0.10) (0.19)
Actuarial value of a plan 0.80 0.80
0.08 0.07
N 8,922 413
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the means. Numbers
in the brackets are standard errors of the means.
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Table 3: Price of Quality Estimation
Single Family
^Quality 1 1
(.01) (.02)
Exclusive Provider  ^Quality -.42 -.39
(.2) (.29)
Constant 2.7 5.86
(2.64) (9.11)
R2 .33 .21
N 9335 9316
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are estimated
using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications.
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Table 4: Means of the Range of Quality
Range, $ Range, $ Coverage rate, %
Single Family
Firms with two plans
Non-Exclusive 22.3 39.2 67.6
Exclusive 26 48.4 70.0
N 770 770 578
Firms with three plans
Non-Exclusive 22.8 43.3 71.3
Exclusive 18 35.2 70.1
N 394 394 293
Firms with four plans
Non-Exclusive 23.5 45.1 70.5
Exclusive 27.8 53.2 72.4
N 197 197 151
Firms with ﬁve plans
Non-Exclusive 23.9 49.2 73.9
Exclusive 22 42.3 73.1
N 124 124 85
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance diﬀerence
between means at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are
estimated using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications ro-
bust to heteroscedasticity.
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Table 5: Price of Quality for Firms with Two Plans
Single Family
^Quality 1.00 1.00
(.13) (.18)
Exclusive Provider  ^Quality -.31 -.55
(.34) (.61)
Constant 3.2 26.4
(19.2) (74.4)
R2 .18 .09
N 1,259 1,245
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are estimated
using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications. In
the estimation, all ﬁrms with more than 2 plans were
dropped.
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Table 6: Employers Payments for Insurance
Exclusive Non-Exclusive
Sharea Dollars Sharea Dollars
Single Coverage:
Low-quality plans .95 153.2 .85 134.1
Average-quality plans .83 132.5 .83 133.0
High-quality plans .85 142.4 .76 145.5
Family Coverage:
Low-quality plans .71 290.1 .73 307.6
Average-quality plans .65 270.6 .71 296.8
High-quality plans .65 295.2 .62 295.9
* Share of total premium paid by employers.
A plan that is less than one s.d. below the mean is denoted as
low quality; a plan that is more than one s.d. above the mean is
denoted as high quality.
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Table 7: Employers Payments and Quality of Plans
Single Family
^Quality 0.24 0.13
(.01) (.02)
Exclusive Provider  ^Quality .09 0.18
(.15) (0.31)
Constant 94.85 237.77
(2.36) (8.32)
R2 .05 .01
N 9,335 9,316
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity. The standard errors are estimated using a
bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications.
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Table 8: Self-Insured Firms and Exclusive Contracts
Single Coverage
^Quality .96 .91
(.02) (.04)
Exclusive Provider  ^Quality -.28 -.30
(.17) (.25)
Self-Insured  ^Quality -.03 -.03
(.02) (.02)
Const. 8.8 44.2
(2.9) (17.8)
R2 .28 .16
N 10,257 10,238
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity. The standard errors are estimated using
a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications.
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